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Abstract:  This paper embeds a principal-agent model of producer-processor equilibrium within a 
market equilibrium model of contract and cash markets to analyze the impact of contracting on 
the spot market for hogs.  The principal-agent model incorporates both quality differentiation in 
the contract market and an endogenously determined cash market price to account for processor-
producer relationships in equilibrium.  For five types of contracting scenarios, market 
equilibrium conditions are derived, and results are presented for a numerical example.  Contrary 
to previous results, the paper finds that the increased supply of hogs under typical formula-price 
contracts can increase the cash market price and reduce its variance.  
 
 
Copyright 2004 by Yanguo Wang and Edward C. Jaenicke.  All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   1 
Simulating the Impacts of Contract Supplies in a 
Spot Market-Contract Market Equilibrium Setting 
 
Livestock contracting and other forms of vertical coordination can provide positive benefits 
by offering a mechanism to smooth production, share risk, and provide proper incentives for 
attainment of difficult-to-observe quality attributes (see, for example, Lawrence, Schroeder, and 
Hayenga; Hayenga et al.; Martin; Hueth and Ligon; Goodhue; Tsoulouhas and Vukina).  
However, increased acquisitions under contract or agreement, a phenomenon sometimes called 
captive supplies by beef industry observers, can also cause legitimate concern if adverse impacts 
arise from a thinning of the cash market (Hayenga et al.).  For hogs, Hayenga et al. report that 
the cash market volume is dropping sharply, and price reporting will become more problematic.  
The same report also suggests that for the beef sector increased captive supplies and packer 
influence may lead to market price declines or outright price manipulation.   
Empirical market analyses and other theoretical studies devoted to this issue show mixed 
results, with several concluding that the increasing use of contracting in meat packing reduces 
spot market prices and makes cash prices more volatile.  Some empirical analyses that 
investigate beef prices, for example, find that increased captive supplies or forward contracting 
can reduce the cash price (Elam; Schroeder et al.; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder, 1996) or 
increase price variability (Barkley and Schroeder).  Alternatively, others (e.g., Ward, Koontz, 
and Schroeder, 1998) find ambiguous price effects due to shifts in both market supply and 
demand.  Some theoretical studies (e.g., Xia and Sexton) show that contracts with special 
features such as best-price, top-of-the market clauses reduce cash market prices, while others 
(e.g., Azzam) find ambiguous results because captive-supply-induced shifts in market demand 
and supply are not explicitly modeled.     2 
Most if not all of these studies concern the cattle rather than the hog industry.  Moreover, 
these studies, which employ different empirical techniques, data, and model specifications, fall 
short of providing a definitive description of impacts of contracting on the cash prices.  Despite 
evidence to the contrary, none of them incorporates asymmetric information into their models, 
especially imperfectly observed quality differences in the spot market and contract market.  For 
example, several studies summarized by Hayenga et al. report significant quality differences in 
hog quality sourced from contracts and cash market transactions.  In addition, reflecting quality 
differentials, average contract prices are consistently higher than spot market prices (Hayenga et 
al., Buhr and Kunkel). 
Different from existing studies, this paper uses a structural model to analyze the impact of 
contracting on the spot market for hogs.  To account for quality differentiation in the contract 
market, a principal-agent framework that incorporates asymmetric information on hog quality is 
used to model individual processor-producer relationships.  For each type of contract analyzed, 
the market equilibrium is derived via a general equilibrium model by aggregating individual 
demand and supply.  Further, in order to analyze the impact that contracting has on the hog spot 
market, a sensitivity analysis is performed by modifying the model parameters indicating the 
extent of contracting.  Contributions to the existing literature come from (i) embedding the 
principal-agent model of processor-producer equilibrium behavior within a general equilibrium 
model of the hog market and (ii) endogenizing the producers’ participation constraint by linking 
the producers’ contracting decision to the general-equilibrium determined spot price of hogs.  
Existing Marketing Contracts in the Hog Sector 
Buhr and Kunkel and Hayenga et al. summarize the types of marketing contracts available 
in the hog sector.  While more than a half dozen types of contracts exist, this paper focuses on   3 
four major types that offer substantial differences:  fixed-price contracts, market price contracts, 
formula-price contracts with quality premiums, and cost-plus contracts with quality premiums.
1   
Formula-price contracts (which account for 47.2% of all contract types) are based on spot 
market prices plus a price premium or discount.   Some observers have argued that formula price 
contracts do not provide price protections, as they fluctuate along with the market price on which 
they are based.    
Cost-plus contracts specify a price based on feed costs, which comprise the greatest single 
cost of production.  By implicitly setting a minimum price level, these contracts provide risk 
protection in addition to quantity assurance and market access.  These contracts may also have a 
balancing clause where payments are made to contractors/processors when market prices are 
below the contract prices and vice versa.   
Fixed-price and market-price contracts are relatively self-explanatory.  The market-price 
contracts modeled below are a simplified synthesis of the basic features of price-floor contracts 
and price-window contracts, which are used in the hog sector to set a minimum and perhaps a 
maximum price.  When the market price falls above the ceiling or below the floor price, the 
packer and the producer generally split the difference between the two prices.   
The Model 
The model developed below is compartmentalized in three stages:  In stage I, processors 
compete for producers to whom they offer contracts, and each participating producer signs a 
contract with a processor.  In stage II, each producer determines how many hogs to produce and 
deliver to the cash market.  In stage III, when the cash market settles, each processor decides the 
                                                 
1 Since packer-fed supplies account for only a small portion of pork packers’ procurement of hogs, they are excluded 
from this study.  In addition, marketing contracts related to the futures market are also excluded because they are 
beyond the interest of this paper. 
   4 
quantity to purchase in the cash market and both the contract and cash markets clear.  There are 
N homogenous producers and M homogenous processors in this model of the pork sector, with 
M<<N.   In the first stage, each producer decides whether to sign a contract or not.  Suppose 
j n1 producers sign a contract with processor j, where the subscript 1 denotes the contract market.  
For simplicity, we assume 
j n1 is same for every processor j.  Without loss of generality, we 
employ Xia and Sexton’s (2004) assumption that each producer has a short-run supply function, 
ϖ ϖ = = ) ( f q , where q is the quantity of hogs produced andϖ is the expected price the 
producer receives
2.  Each contract producer i independently produces a quantity of hogs  0 q based 
on the short-run supply function and sells a fixed proportion ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β  of his hogs to a processor
3.  
Thus, each processor j obtains  0 1 1 q n Q
j j β =  hogs from the contract market.  On the other hand, 
those producers who do not participate in the contract independently decide to produce a 
quantity s q , again based on the short-run supply function.  Each processor converts procured 
hogs into a finished product according to a production function ) | ( z Q g g = , where z denotes the 
quality of hogs procured and is observable only to producers before delivery.  The production 
function is assumed to be concave in Q and z with  0 ) | ( > z Q gQ ,  0 ) | ( ≤ z Q gQQ  and 
0 ) | ( > z Q g z ,  0 ) | ( ≤ z Q gzz ,  0 ) | ( > z Q gzQ .  Further, each processor incurs costs 
) | ( z Q h h = depending on the quality of hogs procured, with  (.) h being convex in Q and with 
0 ) | ( > z Q hQ ,  0 ) | ( ≥ z Q hQQ , and  0 ) | ( < z Q hz .   
                                                 
2 Xia and Sexton (2004) studied market-price clause and captive supplies in the beef, not hog sector.  
3 The specification of β allows one to investigate the effect of contract supplies on the market equilibrium while 
significantly simplifying the analysis. An economic interpretation of this specification is that β can be viewed as the 
exogenous hedge ratio of individual processors.  Finally, treating β as an exogenous parameter can guarantee the 
existence of the cash market even in cases when contracts are widely preferred in a general equilibrium setting.   
   5 
Since the true hog quality is unobservable to processors before delivery, we assume that 
processors observe the market price of the finished products, such as meat cuts, as an imperfect 
signal of the true quality of hogs delivered.  More specifically, we assume that the market price 
of the finished product is random based on a PDF f(P| z) and a corresponding CDF F(P| z).  It is 
assumed that the CDF F(P| z) satisfies first-order stochastic dominance.   
Since each processor purchases hogs from the cash market on live-weight or carcass weight 
basis, different qualities are not distinguished as precisely as in the contract market.  To simplify 
the analysis, we assume that only average quality is observed in the cash market.  Therefore, 
Akerlof’s lemons argument applies and cash market prices would not provide sufficient 
incentives for hog producers to produce high-quality hogs.  Hence, following this argument, we 
assume that independent producers not participating in contractual relationships will produce 
only low-quality hogs } {z , while contract producers (who also sell some hogs in the cash market) 
will produce either high- or low-quality hogs depending on the individual contract.  For 
simplicity, the quality of hogs available in the cash market is specified as the arithmetic mean of 
hog qualities sold by contract and independent producers to the spot market.
4   
The unobservability of quality also plays an important role in how payoffs are structured.  
Since quality is observable only to producers, it cannot be explicitly contracted.  In addition, in 
order to procure high-quality hogs from the contract-participating producers, processors must 
provide enough incentive to encourage high quality from producers.  Therefore, the contract 
price paid to producers by a processor, ) (P w , must depend on the market price of the finished 
product, which can be regarded as the imperfect quality signal. 
                                                 
4 An alternative assumption is that the quality of hogs available in the cash market is the weighted average of hog 
quality sold.  However, this treatment would significantly complicate the derivation of equilibrium conditions 
without altering the nature of the results.     6 
To simplify the analysis further, we assume that the output function of each processor is a 
linear function t z t Q z Q g α = ) | (  with  z z α α <  indicating the fact that high-quality hogs yield 
more finished product than low-quality hogs.  The processing cost function for each packer takes 




) | ( t t z t Q z Q h µ γ + =  where  t µ is a serially uncorrelated normally-
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 
2
µ σ  affecting the processing cost 
function at time t.  Additionally, it is assumed that z z γ γ < , reflecting the fact that low-quality 
hogs incur higher processing costs than high-quality hogs.   
Contract producers have a time-invariant utility function  ) , ( ) ( 0 q z v W u − , where 
0 0 ) 1 ( ) ( q p q P w W
s
t β β − + = represents the total revenue of each contract-participating producer 
from both the contract market and the cash market, and
s
t p is the spot market price at time t.  
However, for independent producers, total revenue comes only from the spot market; that is, 
s
s
t q p W = .  Additionally, it is assumed that u is concave in W with  0 ) (
' > W u  and  0 ) (
' ' ≤ W u .  In 
most cases, producers’ utility functions are assumed to have the property of constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA),  ) exp( 1 ) ( rW W u − − = , where r is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion.  Then the expected utility  )] ( [ W u E  is tantamount to  ) var(
2
1
W r EW − . Finally, 
each producer incurs disutility according to the function 
2
0 0) , ( q c q z v z =  with  z z c c < .   
Given the above assumptions, each processor maximizes its net profit: 
(1)  ) ~ | ( ] ) ~ | ( ) ~ | ( [ ) | ( ] ) ( ) | ( ) | ( [ max 2 2 2 1 1 1
, , 1 2
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Ω ∈
− − β β    7 
(3)    } , { , ) , ˆ ( ) ˆ | ( )] ) 1 ( ) ( ( [ max arg 0 0 0 1
ˆ





∈ ∀ − − + ∈ ∫
Ω ∈
− β β  
where  
1 − t E = Mathematical expectation operator of spot market price conditional on information 
available at time t-1, 
0 1 1 q n Q
j j
t β =  hogs to be procured by processor j from the contract market, 
=
j
t q2 Hogs to be procured by processor j from the spot market, 
= z ~
 Average quality of hogs sold in the cash market, and 
=
s
t p  Market price of hogs sold in the cash market at time t. 
The individual rationality constraint (2) requires that the expected payoff to each 
participating contract producer should be no less than that when he sells all his hogs to the cash 
market.   The incentive compatibility constraint (3), which also contains the endogenous cash 
price, ensures that under the compensation schedule w(P) the producer’s optimal quality choice 
is z.   
The market equilibrium then requires that aggregated supply equals aggregated demand in 
both the contract market and the cash market.   Further, we assume that the contract market 
supply is perfectly elastic; therefore, we only need to solve the equilibrium spot market price.  
Specifically, market-clearing in the spot market requires the following condition: 










d s = − + − ⇒ = − β , 
From this general “dual equilibrium” setting, five separate cases are analyzed:  (i) In case 
one, the processor optimally offers the producer a fixed price w P w = ) (  independent of P, and 
the producer is risk neutral, i.e.,  W W u = ) ( . (ii) In case two, the contract price is again fixed, but 
now the producer is risk averse, i.e.,  ) exp( 1 ) ( rW W u − − = .  (iii) In case three, the contract price   8 
is set equal to the spot market price, i.e., 
s
t p P w = ) ( .  (iv) In case four, which examines a 
formula-price contract with a quality premium, we assume the contract takes a linear form in 
terms of the market price of the finished product, P, i.e.,  bP a p P w
s
t + + = ) ( . (v) In case five, a 
cost-plus contract with a quality premium, we also assume that the contract takes a linear form, 
bP a c P w z + + = ~ ) ( (where it is assumed that  2 / ) ( ~ z z z c c c + = ). 
These five cases are essentially solved the same way:  The overall market equilibrium is 
solved for simultaneously with the principal-agent equilibrium.  In terms of the set up and 
solution methods, the only differences among the cases are the form of the payment w(P) and the 
form of the utility function u(W).  Because of these similarities, the solution for only one case, 
case (iv), is described below.
5  In terms of outcomes, however, we find that a fixed-contract price 
or a market-price contract can induce producers to produce only low-quality hogs, while 
formula-price and cost-plus contracts with quality premium can induce high-quality hogs from 
contract-participating producers.   
Market conditions for formula-price contracts with quality premium 
In this case, we assume the average quality of hogs in the cash market will be an arithmetic 
average of high quality and low quality: specifically,  2 / ) ( ~ z z z + = .  Additionally, we assume 
the marginal product of finished hogs acquired from the spot market is  2 / ) ( ~ z z z α α α + = .  
However, producers who sign a formula-price contract with price premium will produce high-
quality hogs only. The processing cost still takes the form  2 / ) ( ) | (
2
t t z t Q z Q h µ γ + =  with 
z z z γ γ γ ≤ < ~ , where  z ~ γ is defined by  2 / ) ( ~ z z z γ γ γ + = . 
                                                 
5 The solutions for the other cases can be obtained by contacting the authors.   9 
Given these assumptions, each processor maximizes its net profit subject to each 
producer’s participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint.  That is,  
(5) 
) ~ | ( ] ) ~ | ( ) ~ | ( [
) | ( ] ] [ ) | ( ) | ( [ max
2 2 2
1 1 1
, , , 1 2
z P dF q p z q h z q Pg







































t t q z v q p u E q z v z P dF q p bP a p q u E ) , ( )] ( [ ) , ( ) | ( )] ) 1 ( ) ( ( [ 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
(7)  ∫
Ω ∈







q z v z P dF q p bP a p q u E z ) , ˆ ( ) ˆ | ( )] ) 1 ( ) ( ( [ max arg 0 0 0 1
ˆ
β β . 
Before deriving the first-order conditions, the parameters {a, b} in the contract price can be 
derived as follows.  Given the specification of the contract price, conditions (6) and (7) must be
 
binding because, otherwise, the processor can always reduce the
 
contract price until both of the
 
constraints become equalities.  Given each producer’s gross revenue, 






t + β + = β − + + + β = , for any P we have 
) ( 0 0 1 bP a q q p E EW
s




t p q W = .  
  
Thus, the condition (6) is equivalent to  
(8)   ) , ( ) , ( ] | [ 0 0 0 0 q z v q z v z P E q b q a − = β + β .
 
Similarly, the condition (7) becomes 
(9)
    
). , ( ) , ( ] | [ ] | [ 0 0 0 0 q z v q z v z P bE q z P bE q − = − β β  
Thus, the parameters {a, b} in the contract price can be computed by the conditions (8) and 
(9).  Precisely, 
(10)    
) (
)] , ( ) , ( [
]) | [ ] | [ (
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, and   10  
(11)    
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Substituting (10) and (11) into the price specification,  bP a p P w
s
t + + = ) ( , yields the 
contract price w(P)  ). (
) (













  Note that the optimal contract price 
consists of the spot market price and a quality premium, which is positively related to the 
difference between the observed price of finished products and the expected price of finished 
products of low quality.   
Furthermore, given
2
0 0) , ( q c q z v z = , the contract price can be written as 
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Given the contract price (12) and producers’ short-run supply function, each contract 
producer produces the following quantity: 
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Again, independent producers choose to produce  
(14)    
s
t t s p E q 1 − = . 
Thus, the first-order optimality conditions to this problem are ready to be derived.  First, 
the optimal quantity of hogs demanded from the spot market, 
j
t q2 , must satisfy 
  0 ) ~ | ( ] ) ( [ 2 ~ ~
2










t z z j
t
µ γ α ,    11  
from which 


















Second, the number of producers that each processor contracts with,
j n1 , must satisfy 
0 ) | ( ] ) ( ) ( [ 0 1 0 0
1










t z z j β µ β γ β α ,  
from which we can obtain 














µ γ α − − − −
= . 
The spot market price can be obtained by setting market demand equal to market supply in 
the spot market.  That is, Q2s = Q2d, 













j = − − − = − + − − − β β  
Substituting the conditions (13), (14), (15), and (16) and taking the expectation operator 1 − t E on 
both sides (applying the assumption  0 1 = − t t E µ ), we can derive  the expected spot market price: 
(18)    
]
)] ( 1 [











































Substituting (18) back into (17) solves the spot market price: 
(19)  
t
z z z z z
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Hence, the variance of the spot market price can be computed as 
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− = . 
Similarly, substituting (10), (11), (13), and (19) into (16) yields the number of producers 
with which each processor signs a contract: 
(22)   t s
t t z z z z z
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p E c c
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We can now compute each processor’s profit under the formula-price contract, 
) ~ | ( ] ) ~ | ( ) ~ | ( [ ) | ( ] ) ( ) | ( ) | ( [ 2 2 2 1 1 1
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Hence, the expected profit under the formula price contract is 
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and variance of each processor’s profit is
   13  
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In a similar fashion, one can derive the spot price, the contract supply, the cash-market 
supply, processor profits, and producer welfare under the other four cases mentioned above. 
A Numerical Example and Market Performance Results 
For each of these scenarios, a numerical example shows how the various contracts affect 
contract supply and the spot market price, and producers’ and processors’ welfare.  Finally, the 
example also shows the impact of market power, in terms of  M N / , on the performance of each 
contract. 
To start, we assume that the randomness associated with the market price of the finished 
product, P, is governed by an exponential distribution function:  z e z P f
z P / ) ( ) | (
/ − = , 
, 0 ∞ < ≤ P  and  0 > z .  Thus E(P| z) = z.  For the numerical example, the values of parameters 
} , , , , , , , {
2
µ σ γ γ α α β N M   r, , z , z , c , c   z z z z z z  are listed in Table 1. Given these parameter values, 
Table 2 shows the equilibrium expected prices and quantities from the numerical example and 
also forms the basis for Figures 1 to 9.
6   
Table 1:  Parameters used in the numerical example 
z   4    z   3 
β   60%-95%   z c   0.1 
z α   0.5   M  10 
z α   0.4   N   50 
z γ   0.2   2
µ σ 0.5 
z γ   0.3   r   0.1-2 
z c   0.3      
                                                 
6 Results were also calculated but are not presented for cases where N = 20 and 100.  In addition, although the 
numerical example is conducted with the risk aversion parameter in the range 0.1 to 2, only the results for r = 0.5 are 
presented.  The results for other values of r and N are very similar to those in Table 2.     14  
Case (i), fixed-price contracts under risk neutrality:  With risk neutrality, the contract price 
takes the form
s
t t p E w 1 − = .  Under this contract, the expected spot market price is the lowest 
among all types of contracts except the market price contract.  In this case, contract supplies do 
not have any causal effect on the expected spot market price or its variance, and both contract 
supplies and the expected spot market price stay constant.  Thus, by producing low-quality hogs, 
a risk-neutral producer is always indifferent between signing a contract and selling to the spot 
market regardless of values ofβ .   
Case (ii), fixed- price contracts under risk aversion:  Under this contract, the contract price 







t t p rq p E w β − − = − .  Figure 1 demonstrates that contract supplies 
have a positive relationship with the expected spot market prices and the variance of the spot 
market prices.  This result suggests that as β  increases, processors have the incentive to raise the 
contract price to make risk-averse producers indifferent between signing a contract and selling to 
the spot market.  Increases in the contract price reduce the quantity demanded by each processor 
from the contract market and, hence, raise the quantity supplied to the spot market.  
Consequently, the quantity supplied to the spot market exceeds the quantity demanded from the 
spot market and the expected spot market price decreases.   
Case (iii), market-price contracts with risk averse producers:  Similar to the fixed-price 
contract with risk neutrality, contract supplies through the market-price contract do not affect the 
expected spot market price or its variance.   Under the market-price contract, a contract producer 
is indifferent both ex ante and ex post between signing a contract and selling to the spot market, 
and strictly prefers to produce low-quality hogs regardless of the parameterβ .  Hence, given any 
value of β , a processor optimally purchases half of his hogs from the contract market and half   15  
from the spot market under expectation.  While equilibrium market conditions are similar to the 
scenario with fixed-price contracts and risk neutrality, market-price contracts cause a smaller 
variance of spot market price. 
Case (iv), formula-price contracts with premiums:  Under this scenario, Figure 2 shows that 
contract supplies are positively related to the expected spot market price and negatively related to 
its variance under the formula-price contract.  These effects highlight the link between market 
equilibrium and the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints:  As the parameter β  
increases, processors reduce the contract price to make contract producers indifferent between 
signing a contract and selling to the spot market.  Decreases in the contract price raise the 
quantity demanded by each processor from the contract market and, hence, reduce the quantity 
supplied to the spot market.  As a result, the quantity demanded from the spot market exceeds the 
quantity supplied to the spot market and the expected spot market price increases.   
Note also that the expected market price under formula-price contracts is greater than those 
under the fixed-price or market-price contracts due to quality differences between the contract 
market and the cash market.  Moreover, the formula-price contract causes the smallest variability 
of spot market prices among all types of contracts.  Another important property of this contract is 
that it makes the spot market thinner than the fixed-price contract and the market-price contract.  
Given the example shown in Table 2, spot market supply accounts for about 40.5%, on average, 
of total supply.  Therefore, this effect of the formula-price contract is consistent with what has 
been observed in the hog and beef markets.   
Case (v), cost-plus contract with premium:  Similar to the formula-price contract, here both 
contract supply and the expected spot market price increase asβ  increases.  Further, Figure 3 
shows that the increase in contract supply due to the cost-plus contract raises the expected spot   16  
market price and its variance (unlike results under the formula-price contract scenario).  Results 
also show that the contract price decreases as β  increases.  Thus, each processor purchases more 
hogs from the contract market and, hence, the quantity supplied to the spot market decreases.  
Consequently, the excess demand in the spot market drives up the equilibrium spot market price, 
which in turn raises the output of independent producers as well as contract producers.   
Note that for each value of β , the expected spot market price under a cost-plus contract is 
the greatest among all types of contracts.  However, the variance of the spot market price is also 
greater than that under the formula-price contract and the market-price contract.   Similar to the 
formula-price contract, the spot market becomes thinner under the cost plus contract and is, in 
fact, the thinnest of all the contract scenarios considered. 
Welfare Effects and the Impact of Market Power 
Welfare effects also tend to highlight the tradeoff between risk and returns.  Under the 
fixed-price contract – case (i), processors’ expected profit stays constant asβ  increases.  
However, processors obtain a relatively greater profit than producers.  In addition, processors can 
eliminate all risk in their profit by adjusting the quantities demanded from the spot market and 
the contract market.  On the other hand, changes in β  do not affect producers’ expected utility, 
and contract producers earn the same expected utility as independent producers.  However, asβ  
increases, contract producers face a smaller variance of their income relative to independent 
producers.   
For case (ii), Figure 4 shows that an increase in contract supplies raises both processors’ 
expected profit and the variance of processors’ profit.  On the other hand, as each contract 
producer signs a greater proportion of his hogs with a processor, total contract supply decreases 
and both contract producers and independent producers obtain a smaller expected utility.    17  
Further, since processors can depress the contract price as producers’ degree of risk aversion 
increases, processors capture more surplus and, hence, contract producers earn a lower utility 
relative to independent producers under this contract.  In addition, increases in contract supply 
raise the variance of producers’ income.  However, since the contract price is fixed given each r 
andβ , contract producers face a relatively smaller variance of their income than independent 
producers.   Figure 5 shows these impacts of contract supplies on both contract producers’ and 
independent producers’ profit.   
Under the market-price contract – case (iii), just as in the fixed-price contract with risk 
neutrality, changes inβ  do not affect the amount of contract supplies, processors’ profit, and 
producers’ profit.  Asβ  increases, the variance of both contract producers’ and independent 
producers’ income stays constant.  Compared to the fixed-price contract with risk neutrality, 
however, contract producers face a larger variance of income, while independent producers face 
a smaller variance of income under the market-price contract.   Further, under the market-price 
contract, both processors and producers obtain smaller profit or utility relative to those under the 
fixed-price contract with risk neutrality; and processors earn the smallest profit among all types 
of contracts.     
Figure 6 shows that, for formula-price contracts with quality premiums – case (iv), both 
processors’ expected profit and variance of processors’ profit increase as contract supplies 
increase.  On the other hand, Figure 7 shows contract supply is positively related to producers’ 
expected utility and variance of producers’ income.  Compared with independent producers, 
contract producers obtain a greater expected utility, but also face a greater variance of their 
income.  Because processors can acquire high-quality hogs from the contract market, they earn a 
greater profit than that under the fixed-price contract and the market price contract due to greater   18  
profitability of high-quality hogs.  Similarly, although producers incur high production costs by 
providing high-quality hogs to the market, both contract producers and independent producers 
can obtain a greater utility from high spot market prices and high contract prices.  Risk-averse 
producers also benefit from low variance of spot market prices.   
The performance of cost-plus contracts with quality premium – case (v) – is very similar to 
formula price contracts.  Figure 8 shows that increased contract supplies raise processors’ profit 
and variance of processors’ profit, and the variance of processors’ profit rises relatively slower 
than expected profit as contract supplies increase.  The cost-plus contract offers the greatest 
profit to processors among all types of contracts.  Compared to the formula price contract, 
however, processors incur a greater variance of profit.  Figure 9 shows that both contract 
producers’ and independent producers’ expected utilities increase as contract supplies increase.  
However, increased contract supplies raise the variance of independent producers’ income, while 
they reduce the variance of contract producers’ income.   In addition, contract producers obtain a 
greater expected utility and a greater variance of income relative to independent producers for 
each level of contract supply.  Compared to the formula-price contract, contract producers earn a 
lower expected utility but face a smaller variance of income, while independent producers obtain 
a greater expected utility but face a greater variance of their income.   
To demonstrate the effects of market power on the performance of the five types of 
contract scenarios, one can vary, N/M, the ratio between the number of producers and the number 
of processors, given the same set of parameters.  As N/M increases, processors gain more market 
power in the sense that they can manipulate the market equilibrium more significantly.  Without 
loss of generality, we analyze the impact of market power by fixing the number of processors M 
= 10 and setting the number of producers N = 20, 50, 100.     19  
For each value ofβ  under each type of contract, the expected spot market price is pushed 
down as N increases.  However, the variance of spot market price stays unchanged.  As a result, 
processors purchase more hogs from both the contract and spot markets due to the lower prices 
and, hence, both the contract and spot markets expand.  As N increases, processors gain market 
power as buyers; hence, more surplus is captured by processors through both the contract market 
and the spot market.  Thus, under each type of contract, processors obtain a greater profit as N 
increases.  However, each processor incurs a greater variance of profit under each contract as N 
increases. On the other hand, each producer earns a smaller expected utility due to the reduced 
spot market price and the reduced amount of hogs produced by each producer.  However, each 
producer faces a smaller variance of income as well.   
Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper investigates the relationship between the hog contract and spot markets, and 
provides a general methodology for analyzing this type of problem.  Different from most studies, 
this paper embeds a principal-agent model of processor-producer behavior within a general 
equilibrium model of the hog market and accounts for the endogenous relationship between 
contract supplies and the spot market price.  The paper also incorporates asymmetric information 
concerning hog qualities into the equilibrium model. Finally, the paper investigates the 
relationship between the contract and the spot markets under five different contract scenarios.   
Major findings from the structural model and the numerical example are summarized in 
Table 3.   At least two main results differ from those of previous studies:  First, the paper finds 
that contract supplies raise the expected spot market price under a formula-price and cost-plus 
contracts while reducing (increasing) the variance of spot market price under formula-price 
(cost-plus) contracts.  Second, the paper finds that the formula-price contract offers the second   20  
highest expected profit to processors, highest expected utility to contract producers, and the 
second highest expected utility to independent producers relative to other contracts.  This second 
result is at odds with studies that report producers’ complaints of formula-price contracts not 
providing price protection.   Here, both processors and producers prefer the formula-price 
contract to the fixed-price or market-price contacts if asymmetric information about hog quality 
is taken into account.   Compared to cost-plus contracts, formula-price contracts offer processors 
smaller expected profit and independent producers lower expected utility, but offer contract 
producers greater expected utility.  In fact, performances of the cost-plus and formula-price 
contracts are both better than the fixed-price and market-price contracts.  These results are 
consistent with current observations that formula-price contracts are dominant in the hog sector.    21  
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s) q0 q s 





( j Mq2 ) 
processor 
profit 
E[Π]  var(Π)* u1* varInc1* u2* varInc2* 
(i) Fixed-price contracts with risk neutrality (r = 0) 
0.6 0.6857  0.18  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 4.1667 17.143 17.143 0.88163 0 0.42318 1.354E-02 0.4232 0.0846
0.7 0.6857  0.18  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 3.5714 17.143 17.143 0.88163 0 0.42318 7.617E-03 0.4232 0.0846
0.8 0.6857  0.18  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 3.1250 17.143 17.143 0.88163 0 0.42318 3.386E-03 0.4232 0.0846
0.9 0.6857  0.18  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 2.7778 17.143 17.143 0.88163 0 0.42318 8.464E-04 0.4232 0.0846
(ii)  Fixed-price contracts 
0.6 0.7092  0.19232  0.6816 0.7092 1.6362 4.3747 17.891 16.362 0.89214 8.24E-05 0.41457 1.430E-02 0.4284 0.0967
0.65 0.7082  0.19184  0.6796 0.7082 1.6393 4.0431 17.86 16.393 0.89162 7.39E-05 0.41295 1.085E-02 0.4273 0.0962
0.7 0.7073  0.19137  0.6778 0.7073 1.6425 3.7581 17.83 16.425 0.89111 6.62E-05 0.41144 7.912E-03 0.4263 0.0957
0.75 0.7063  0.1909  0.6761 0.7063 1.6455 3.5103 17.8 16.455 0.89063 5.92E-05 0.41002 5.454E-03 0.4252 0.0952
0.8 0.7054  0.19043  0.6746 0.7054 1.6486 3.2928 17.77 16.486 0.89016 5.29E-05 0.40871 3.466E-03 0.4242 0.0948
0.85 0.7045  0.18996  0.6733 0.7045 1.6516 3.1001 17.742 16.516 0.88972 4.71E-05 0.40748 1.938E-03 0.4232 0.0943
0.9 0.7036  0.1895  0.6721 0.7036 1.6546 2.9283 17.713 16.546 0.88928 4.19E-05 0.40635 8.560E-04 0.4221 0.0938
0.95 0.7028  0.18904  0.6711 0.7028 1.6575 2.7739 17.685 16.575 0.88886 3.72E-05 0.4053 2.129E-04 0.4211 0.0934
(iii)  Market-price contracts 
0.6 0.6857 0.045  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 4.1667 17.143 17.143 0.73163 0 0.41789 0.021159 0.4179 0.0212
0.7 0.6857 0.045  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 3.5714 17.143 17.143 0.73163 0 0.41789 0.021159 0.4179 0.0212
0.8 0.6857 0.045  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 3.125 17.143 17.143 0.73163 0 0.41789 0.021159 0.4179 0.0212
0.9 0.6857 0.045  0.6857 0.6857 1.7143 2.7778 17.143 17.143 0.73163 0 0.41789 0.021159 0.4179 0.0212
(iv)  Formula-price contracts 
0.6 0.9449  0.0258  1.1812 0.9449 2.5202 4.6658 33.067 25.202 1.7763 5.413E-04 0.96761 0.036032 0.7979 0.0231
0.65 0.9587  0.0257  1.1984 0.9587 2.4653 4.3174 33.629 24.653 1.7796 5.431E-04 0.99601 0.036936 0.8213 0.0236
0.7 0.9708  0.0256  1.2135 0.9708 2.4167 4.017 34.123 24.167 1.7834 5.491E-04 1.0214 0.037746 0.8422 0.0242
0.75 0.9816  0.0256  1.2270 0.9816 2.3736 3.7555 34.56 23.736 1.7876 5.577E-04 1.0443 0.038478 0.8610 0.0246
0.8 0.9913  0.0255  1.2391 0.9913 2.335 3.5258 34.949 23.35 1.7919 5.678E-04 1.0649 0.03914 0.8781 0.0251
0.85 0.9999  0.0254  1.2499 0.9999 2.3003 3.3225 35.299 23.003 1.7963 5.789E-04 1.0837 0.039743 0.8935 0.0254
0.9 1.0078  0.0254  1.2597 1.0078 2.2689 3.1413 35.614 22.689 1.8008 5.905E-04 1.1008 0.040294 0.9076 0.0258
0.95 1.0149  0.0254  1.2686 1.0149 2.2403 2.9787 35.9 22.403 1.8051 6.023E-04 1.1164 0.040799 0.9205 0.0261
(v)  Cost-plus contracts 
0.6 0.9640  0.0901  1.1772 0.9640 2.4438 4.8186 34.035 24.438 1.9354 0.0323 0.96506 1.998E-02 0.8155 0.0838
0.65 0.9783  0.0928  1.1925 0.9783 2.3869 4.465 34.609 23.869 1.9427 0.0339 0.99136 1.617E-02 0.8391 0.0889
0.7 0.9907  0.0952  1.2057 0.9907 2.3373 4.1595 35.106 23.373 1.95 0.0356 1.0145 1.245E-02 0.8600 0.0934
0.75 1.0016  0.0972  1.2173 1.0016 2.2937 3.8927 35.539 22.937 1.9571 0.0372 1.035 9.003E-03 0.8785 0.0975
0.8 1.0112  0.0990  1.2275 1.0112 2.2553 3.6577 35.919 22.553 1.964 0.0389 1.0533 5.966E-03 0.8949 0.1012
0.85 1.0197  0.1005  1.2366 1.0197 2.2213 3.4491 36.254 22.213 1.9705 0.0404 1.0696 3.459E-03 0.9097 0.1045
0.9 1.0272  0.1019  1.2448 1.0272 2.191 3.2625 36.55 21.91 1.9766 0.0419 1.0843 1.579E-03 0.9228 0.1075
0.95 1.0340  0.1031  1.2522 1.0340 2.164 3.0945 36.813 21.64 1.9823 0.0434 1.0976 4.043E-04 0.9347 0.1103
 
 
Notes (*):  u1 and u2 represent the expected utilities of contract and independent producers, and varInc1 and varInc2 represent the 
variances of contract and independent producers’ incomes. 24 
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 Notes: 
1.  “No change” indicates that contract supplies have no effect on the variable listed in the column 
heading.   “Positive” indicates that contract supplies have a positive relationship with that variable; 
“negative” indicates a negative relationship.  
2.  The order (ranking) is based on the relative magnitude of variable listed in the column heading for all 
five contract scenarios.  If no order is indicated, relative rankings are indeterminate. The shaded boxes 
reflect the two most preferred rankings.   
   25  
 Figure 1:  Contract supplies v. expected spot market price and variance under fixed-price 
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Figure 4:  Contract supplies vs. processors’ expected profit and variance of processors’ profit 














































































Figure 5:  Contract supplies vs. producers’ expected profit and variance under fixed-price 
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Figure 6:  Contract supplies vs. processors’ expected profit and variance of processors’ profit 
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Figure 8: Contract supplies vs. processors’ expected profit and variance of processors’ profit 
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